With the British trying to pull out of Basra, the impression one gets from reading the MSM is that we are now alone, or almost alone, in Iraq. Does anyone know this? More than 30 nations still have "boots on the ground" in Iraq. From a soldier who regularly checks in at Powerline: (H/T Instapundit) I'm back over here for my fourth Army Reserve stint since 2004. What a difference a year makes. In late 2006 and early 2007, just after surge had been announced, many commentators and thinkers -- in uniform and out -- thought that Anbar was hopeless, a lost cause. Just google "Anbar Lost" to see what I mean. Nowadays, it has been weeks since we lost a ...

The latest National Intelligence Estimate shows significant improvement in security in Iraq: Report: Security in Iraq Is Improving Friday April 4 2008 By PAMELA HESS Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP) - A new classified intelligence assessment on Iraq says there has been significant progress in security since the last assessment was delivered in August, a senior military official said. . . . Since the August report, Sunni tribes have solidified their resistance to al-Qaida-associated insurgents in Anbar and Diyala provinces, which has weakened the movement. The National Intelligence Estimate is part of a series of periodic reports that offer the best consensus judgment of top analysts at all 16 U.S. spy agencies on major foreign policy, security and global economic issues. Congress received the new ...

Dan Henninger of the Wall Street Journal makes the point that the Dems so long for Iraq to turn into Vietnam that they are describing the fighting in Basra as George Bush's Tet Offensive. Welcome to 1968. Is it uncharitable to suggest that when the fighting erupted in Basra last week between Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the U.S.-trained Iraqi army, some opponents of the war hoped it would become George Bush's Tet Offensive? That is, a battle whose military details are largely irrelevant, but whose sudden violence "proves" to voters that a U.S. military commitment is unwinnable and should be abandoned? It was hard not to miss the ...

Here's an excellent interview of Ben Stein by R. C. Sproul on Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed. After R.C. rattles off philosophical critique after philosophical critique, Ben remarks to R.C., "You're a very smart guy." Two smart guys. Both gifted in their own way.  

You won't find this in the NYTimes, but in Karmah, Iraq our soldiers are adored by school children as if they were rock stars. God bless Michael Totten for getting the truth out. The Liberation of Karmah, Part II KARMAH, IRAQ — The small city of Karmah sits between Fallujah and Baghdad, two Iraqi cities that have suffered more insurgent and terrorist violence than most. Karmah, however, was more hard-hit than either. It’s right on the bleeding edge of Anbar Province where the outskirts of Baghdad taper away. Unlike Fallujah, it has no hard perimeter to defend, nor was it considered a top priority for counterinsurgency operations. Surge forces in Baghdad drove Al Qaeda ...

Yesterday Dith Pran, survivor of the killing fields of Cambodia, died at 65. He is pictured here in 1989 during a return trip to Cambodia where he saw the remains of some of the Khmer Rouge's victims. This picture, and Mr. Pran's personal story, shows what happens when Good withdraws from battling Evil. If we leave Iraq too soon, al Qaeda will re-emerge and there will be more killing fields: Iraq: Al-Qaeda Killing Field Found Near Farming Village ZAHAMM, IRAQ -- Villagers digging in an abandoned pomegranate orchard in the Diyala River Valley have unearthed the remains of at least 52 people murdered by Al-Qaeda in Iraq during ...

Amy Proctor has a great video up on CNN correspondent Michael Ware commenting on what is happening in Basra. MICHAEL WARE, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Wolf, what’s going on is the future of Iraq without U.S. forces, welcome to it. You think Lebanon in the ’80s was bad? Many people say that the future of Iraq with a timetable for withdrawal will be exactly what you’re seeing now. We’re seeing Iranian backed Shia faction fighting Iranian backed Shia faction. But put it this way, Wolf, Americans are still in South Korea. Now if you think American troops can withdraw next year, then someone is being delusional. Now, the Brits in the south of Iraq who technically once owned Basra have now retreated to the ...

After ignoring Iraq for months (when things were going well), the Mainstream Media returned to reporting on Iraq with a vengeance when it appeared that things weren't going so well. Well, the MSM got it wrong (again): Remind me again — who’s losing in Basra? posted at 9:48 am on March 30, 2008 by Ed Morrissey When the Iraqi government finally took the long-expected action to establish control of Basra after the British pullback left it in the hands of militias and gangsters, suddenly the media declared that the country had reached the brink of collapse. They highlighted stories of defections from the Iraqi military and opined that the surge had failed. Moqtada al-Sadr would finally ...

Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy at Duke University and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, analyzes the success of the surge in Commentary (via WSJ): Anatomy of the Surge By PETER D. FEAVER March 26, 2008 Over the past 16 months, the United States has altered its trajectory in Iraq. We are no longer headed toward a catastrophic defeat and may be on the path to a remarkable victory. As a result, the next president, Democrat or Republican, may well find it easier to adopt the broad contours of this administration's current strategy than to jeopardize progress by changing course abruptly. That would be an ironic, but satisfying, outcome to the tortuous journey on which the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq, and this nation's views of Iraq, have been traveling over the past three years. The administration's description of the long-term American goal--a democratic Iraq that can defend itself, govern itself and sustain itself, and will be an ally in the war on terror--has remained consistent from the time the war was launched in 2003 until now. What has shifted, due to sobering experience, is its sense of how long it might take to achieve this goal: a time frame that has stretched from months, to years, and even to decades. I witnessed the shift firsthand. For two years, from June 2005 to July 2007, I left my teaching position at Duke to join the National Security Council staff as a special adviser for strategic planning, and in that capacity I worked closely on Iraq policy. By the middle of 2005, it was painfully obvious to everyone involved that the only decisive outcome that could be achieved during President Bush's tenure was the triumph of our enemies, America's withdrawal, and Iraq's descent into a hellish chaos as yet undreamed of. The challenge, therefore, was to develop and implement a workable strategy that could be handed over to Mr. Bush's successor. Although important progress could be made on that strategy during Mr. Bush's watch, ultimately it would be carried through by the next president. This was the reality behind the course followed by the administration in 2005-06, and it remains the reality behind the new and different course the administration has been following since 2007. This new and different strategy, now called the "surge" but at one point called by insiders the "bridge," emerged out of a growing recognition over 2006 that our critics were right about one thing: Our Iraq policy was not working. At the same time, however, and whether knowingly or ignorantly, many of those same critics were insisting that the answer lay in pursuing precisely the same strategy we already had in place. That is, they were telling us that we needed (a) to push Iraqi government officials to come together politically and (b) to train Iraqi troops so that they could take over from American forces. We had been doing exactly these things for a year, and we had been driven to the brink. This was no solution at all. The results on the ground in Iraq made it clear that without a dramatic change, the president would be leaving his successor with an untenable mess, if not the prospect of a catastrophic American rout. A review of administration policy was therefore launched that led to the dramatic course revision we have seen unfolding over the past year-and-a-half. Next month, the military leader of the surge, Gen. David Petraeus, and America's chief diplomat in Iraq, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, will present their second report to Congress on the surge and its effects. Prudent and circumspect men, they will surely not advance bold claims on behalf of the policy the United States has been following under their leadership. But I expect they will speak more optimistically about the future than many thought possible eighteen months ago. Their testimony will demonstrate that, at last, the United States has a sustainable strategy for Iraq with a reasonable chance of success, and one that George W. Bush will be able to turn over with confidence to the next incumbent of the White House. How we got here is a story in itself.

A few years ago an arrogant Blue Stater wrote a book, "What's the Matter with Kansas?" This cartoon from IBD's Michael Ramirez could be the cover of the new book: "What's the Matter with New York and New Jersey?"